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The  purpose of  t hi s study i s t o analyse publ i c expendi t ure grow t h i n No r t hern Cyprus duri ng
t he peri od 1977-1996.   We   t est  t he val i di t y of  W agner’ s Law  t hat   t here i s a l ong-r un t endency
f or  publ i c expendi t ure t o  grow   r elati ve  t o  nat i onal   i ncom e.   Thi s i mp l i es t hat   publ i c expendi t ure
can be tr eated as an outcom e, or an endogenous factor,  not  a cause of grow t h i n nat i onal
i ncom e.   Conversely,   K eynesi an proposi t i on t r eats publ i c expendi t ure as an exogenous factor,
wh i ch coul d  be  ut i l i sed as a pol i cy i nst r um ent .   I n  t he  f orme r   approach,  t he  causali t y  r uns  f r om
nat i onal  incom e t o publ i c expendi t ure w hereas in t he l att er proposi t i on,  causali t y runs fr om
publ i c expendi t ure t o nat i onal   i ncom e.   Ut i l i sing r ecent  advances i n coint egrati on and causali t y
t echni ques,   i n t he case of  No r t hern Cyprus econom y,   we   f i nd t hat   t here i s a mi xed evidence i n
support   of  W agner’ s Law.
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1.   Introduct i on
Sm al l  island econom i es (SI Es )  are characteri sed by absol ut ely sm al l  publ i c sectors
com pared w it h t he publ i c sectors in t he l arger nat i ons.  Ho we v e r ,  due t o i nsuff i cient
pri vat e sector i ncenti ves,  t he publ i c sectors are usual l y ascri bed st r ong soci al and
econom i c r ol es.  I n mo s t   SI Es ,   t he publ i c sector  i s t he ma j or  em ployer  and aims   t o act
as an inst r um ent  to encourage the devel opm ent  process. Thi s result s in si gni f i cant
expansi on of  t he sector  wh e r e t he publ i c expendi t ures are ma i nl y spent  on t he salari es
or  pensi ons of  publ i c sector  em ployees wh i l st  t he budget   r eceipt s of  t he governm ent s
depend onl y on a narr ow  t ax base. A s i gni f i cant source of budget  receipt s for ma n y
SI Es   i s i nevi t ably external   grants wh i ch com e i n t he f orm  of  f oreign aid ( M cK ee and
Ti sdell ,   1990).
The  grow t h i n t he size of  publ i c sector  has r eceived consi derable att enti on f or
several  decades.  I n  part i cular,   t he  r elati onshi p  bet w een publ i c expendi t ure and  nat i onal
i ncom e has been t ested em pir i call y for vari ous count r i es using bot h t i me - seri es and
cross-secti onal  dat a sets w it hi n t he cont ext of ‘W agner’ s L aw ’.  W agner’ s  La w wa s
proposed by G erm an pol i t i cal econom i st,  W agner ( 1883).  A m ong t he several
i nt erpretati ons,  the m ost  popul ar int erpretati on of the Law  st ates that  the i ncrease in
econom i c acti vi t i es cause an increase in governm ent  acti vi t i es, wh i ch in t urn raises
publ i c expendi t ure.
I n t hi s study,  we  a i m t o ut i l i se W agner’ s L aw  to em pi r i call y analyse publ i c
expendi t ure grow t h i n a sm all   i sland,   Cyprus,   i n part i cular  No r t hern Cyprus wh e r e t he
r ol e of  governm ent   as a ma j or  actor  t o encourage econom i c devel opm ent   and grow t h
has alwa y s   been signi f i cant.   Re l yi ng on t he proposi t i on by Wa g n e r ,   we   wi l l   i nvest i gat e
wh e t her t here is a long-r un t endency for publ i c expendi t ure to grow .  The mai n
mo t i vat i on  behi nd  t hi s study  i s t hat   such analysi s has  not   been att em pted before.
The paper is laid out  as fol l ow s.  Secti on 2 di scusses the publ i c expendi t ure
pat t ern  of  No r t hern  Cyprus.   Secti on  3  bri efl y  expl ains  t he  t heoreti cal  analysi s of  publ i c
expendi t ure grow t h w i t h special em phasi s on W agner’ s L aw . In secti on 4,  dat a and
em pir i cal  me t hodol ogy  are expl ained.   The  em pir i cal  r esult s deri ved  f r om   esti ma t i on  are
covered i n  secti on  5.   Secti on  6  provi des  som e concl usi ons.
2.   An  O verview  of  Publ i c Expendi t ure Behavi our  i n  TRNC3
I n t he i mme d i ate aft erma t h of  t he wa r   i n 1974,   wh i ch l ed t o t he bi zonal i t y of  Cyprus,
Tur ki sh Cypri ot  adm ini str ati on i n t he N ort h faced the chall enge of reorgani sing t he
necessary physi cal  and social  i nfr astr uct ure.  Ther e wa s   an urgent   need on t he part   of
governm ent  to rehabil i t ate the refugee popul ati on si nce the post - wa r  ri sks coupl ed
wi t h  t he  pol i t i cal  uncert aint i es and  t he  l ack of  capit al  accum ulati on  i n  t he  pri vat e sector
hi ndered pot enti al  pri vat e i nvest me n t s.
Ther efore t he  governm ent   becam e t he  l argest   em ployer.   Though  t here we r e no
stati sti cs kept  in t he earl y years of Tur ki sh Cypri ot  adm ini str ati on,  in 1977 publ i c
expendi t ure as a percentage of GDP wa s  3 1 . 4 % .  That  peri od w as characteri sed by






















































Fi gure  1.   O verall   governm ent  spendi ng  i n  TRNC.
Fi gure 1 r eveals t he t i me   pat h of  overall   publ i c expendi t ure at  const ant  pri ces.
Tot al  governm ent   expendi t ure i n 1977 wa s   1186. 1 mi l l i on TL.   Ov e r   t he peri od under
study,   t he  t ot al  publ i c expendi t ure pat h  i n  TRNC  alwa y s   l i es above  24  percent  of  GDP.
I n t he peri od 1978-82,  wi t h t he excepti on of the year 1980,  the t r end i s relati vel y
stable i n  t he  r ange  bet w een 27  and  29%   of  GDP.   The  subst anti al  f all   t o  1019. 5  mi l l i on
TL  i n  1980  corr esponds  t o  24%   and  coinci des  wi t h  t he  mi l i t ary  t ake-over  i n  Tur key  i n
1980  ( wh i ch ma y   have  r esult ed i n  t he  di srupt i on  of  aid  t r ansfers f r om   Tur key).
The  t ot al  governm ent   expendi t ure i ncreases t o 1536. 2 mi l l i on TL  i n 1983 and
j um ps t o 1732. 2 m i l l i on TL i n 1984,  wh i ch coinci des w i t h t he year,  1983,  wh e n  t he
declarati on of  Tur ki sh Republ i c of  No r t hern Cyprus ( TRNC)   as an i ndependent   state
occurr ed. Ov e r  the sam e peri od,  due t o t he second oi l  cri sis (1979-1982/ 83),  mo s t
OECD  count r i es also experi enced a simi l ar  r i se i n t hei r   governm ent   spendi ng.   Ther e i s4
an increasing t r end i n t he TRN C’s governm ent  expendi t ure betw een 1982 and 1987;
how ever,  t he rati o fell  consi derably t o 31. 4%  and 28. 6%  i n 1988 and 1989
r especti vel y.  Thi s is in conj unct i on w i t h t he Econom i c Stabil i t y Prot ocol  signed
bet w een Tur key  and  t he  TRNC  wh i ch aime d   t o  decrease state i nt ervent i on  and  provi de
mo r e i ncenti ves  f or  t he  pri vat e sector.
Ha v i ng t he characteri sti cs of  a sm all   i sland,   TRNC  econom y i s hi ghl y exposed
t o external   shocks.   I n 1991,   t he TRNC  GDP  f ell   by 4. 3%  i n r eal  t erms   because of  t he
severe eff ects of the G ul f  Wa r  and t he col l apse of the m ul t i nat i onal  com pany, PPI .
Fur t her,  i n 1994,  due t o t he econom i c cri sis in Turkey,  GDP f ell  by 4. 1%  (EI U,
1996/ 97).   On   t he ot her  hand,   t he share of  publ i c expendi t ure i n GDP  r ose sharpl y t o
34. 1%  and 39. 5%  i n 1990 and 1991 respecti vel y.  The share in 1992 fell  to t he 1990
l evel,  but  r esum ed it s increase in t he fol l ow i ng years. I n 1996,  t he t ot al publ i c
expendi t ure wa s   2942. 3  mi l l i on  TL,   equi val ent  t o  39%   of  GDP.5
3.   W agner’s Law
On e  o f  t he fr equent l y quot ed styl i sed facts of publ i c sector econom i cs is that  of
“W agner’ s L aw ”. St ated simp l y,  i t  proposes t hat  t here is a long-r un t endency for
publ i c expendi t ure t o grow  r elati ve t o som e nat i onal   i ncom e aggregate such as GDP.
A  num ber  of  t i me   seri es em pir i cal  studi es have i n  t he  past   f ound  support   f or  W agner’ s
Law.   These,  how ever,   mi ght   not   be  r eli able because t hey  di d  not   em ploy  coint egrati on
t ests to est abli sh stati onari t y i n t he relevant vari ables [See for exam ple, Peacock and
Wi sem an ( 1961),   Mu s g r ave ( 1969),   Bi r d  ( 1971)  and  B eck ( 1982)] .
A  num ber of expl anati ons l i e at the foundat i ons of W agner’ s law . Fi r st,  as a
count r y i ndust r i ali ses, publ i c sector acti vi t y,  it  is assert ed, is substi t ut ed for pri vat e
acti vi t i es. Thi s refl ects the need for publ i c prot ecti on as society  b e c o me s  mo r e
com plex through urbani sati on.  Co mme r ce and the i ncreasing com pl exit y of cont r acts
r equi r e support i ng publ i cly funded l egal system . Second,  a num ber of publ i c servi ces
are i ncom e elasti c.  For   exam ple,  educati on and cult ural  acti vi t i es,  W agner  argued,   f all
i nt o  t hi s category  -   as do  healt h  servi ces.  Thi r d,   t he  i m port ance of  nat ural  m onopol i es,
especiall y  i nfr astr uct ure servi ces,  i ncrease as t he  econom y  grow s.
I t   f ol l ow s f r om  t he above di scussion t hat   publ i c expendi t ure i n W agner’ s Law
can be tr eated as an outcom e, or an endogenous factor,  not  a cause of grow t h i n
nat i onal  i ncom e.  Conversely,  t here is anot her approach w hich is associated w it h
K eynes.   He r e,  publ i c expendi t ure i s seen as an exogenous f actor  wh i ch can be used as
a pol i cy i nst r um ent .   The  f orme r   r equi r es t he causali t y t o r un f r om  nat i onal   i ncom e t o
publ i c expendi t ure w hereas in t he l att er fr om  expendi t ure to nat i onal  incom e.  The
K eynesi an proposi t i on on publ i c expendi t ure is support ed by devel opi ng count r i es
wh i ch str ongl y  base  t hei r   econom i c grow t h  on  t he  grow t h  i n  t hei r   publ i c sector.
Thi s study aims   t o exam ine t he causal  r elati onshi p bet w een publ i c expendi t ure
and G D P for the TRN C econom y w here the rol e of governm ent  as a m ajor actor to
encourage econom i c devel opm ent  has al w ays been si gni f i cant.  In addi t i on,  we  u t i l i se
r ecent  advances i n econom et r i cs t o overcom e t he probl em s wh i ch ari se f r om  t he non-
stati onary  t i me   seri es dat a.6
4.   Empi rical  Me t hodol ogy
Us i ng annual  dat a
1 for t he TRN C over t he peri od 1977-1996,  we  i nvest i gat e the
evidence of W agner’ s L aw  using appropri ate esti ma t i on m et hods.  The mos t  popul ar
f ormu l ati on of  W agner’ s Law  i s gi ven i n t he f ol l ow i ng equat i ons,   ( 1a)  and ( 1b)  wh e r e
we   i ncl uded  a d u mmy   vari able f or  t he  year,   1988:
LGEt  =  c 0  +  c 1LGDP t+  c 2  D U 88  +  ut ( 1a)
LGENTt  =  b0  +  b1LGDP t+  b2  D U 88  +  vt ( 1b)
wh e r e
GEt  =  R eal  governm ent   expendi t ure expressed i n  mi l l i on  TL.
GDP t=  R eal  gross dom est i c product   expressed i n  mi l l i on  TL.
GENTt  =  N on-t r ansfer  r eal  governm ent   expendi t ure expressed i n  mi l l i on  TL
2.
D U 88  =  Du mmy   vari able f or  1988  t o  capture t he  eff ects of  t he  r elevant  year.
ut  and  vt  are seri all y  uncorr elated r andom  di sturbance t erms ,   and L  denot es t he nat ural
l ogari t hm .
Fi r stl y,  w e exam ine t he st ati onari t y propert i es of the TRN C dat a using t he
A ugm ent ed D ickey-Ful l er (ADF) .  Then,  we  p r oceed for the order of int egrati on t o
i nvest i gat e wh e t her  t he t i me   seri es are ‘ Di f f erence St ati onary Pr ocess’  ( DSP) ,   against
t he  alt ernat i ve  ‘ Tr end  St ati onary  Pr ocess’  ( TSP) ,   usi ng  Di ckey-Ful l er  LR  j oi nt   t est  ( or
F- t est)   [ See Di ckey and  Ful l er,   1979,   1981].
Secondl y,   wi t h  r espect  t o  t he  seri es,  we   observe  a pot enti al  break i n  1988  -   t he
Econom i c Prot ocol  eff ect.  A ny ki nd of str uct ural break m ay cause unreli able result s
obt ained i n t he fi r st step. Ther efore, we  u t i l i se the addi t i ve out l i er m odel  (AOM)
Per r on t ests f or  uni t   r oot s t o check t he val i di t y of  t he break.  I n ot her  wo r ds,   we   t est
wh e t her  t he order  of  i nt egrati on i s changed by t he pot enti al  str uct ural  break.  Omi t t i ng
t hi s phenom enon m ay create ‘spuri ous uni t  root s’.  Thi s test can be regarded as an
i mp r ovem ent   i n  t i me   seri es procedure ( See Per r on,   1990).
Thi r dl y,   on t he basi s of  t he r esult s obt ained i n t he f i r st  t wo   stages,  i f   t he dat a
areI ( 1) we  t est t he equat i ons (1a) and (1b) by ut i l i sing Engl e-Gr anger ( 1987),
Johansen,   ( 1988)  and  Johansen  and  Juseli us  ( 1990)  me t hods.   Coi nt egrati on  analysi s by7
Engl e-Gr anger (1987) provi des onl y one coi nt egrati ng vect or wh e r eas the Johansen
f ul l  Informa t i on M axi mu m Li kel i hood (ML )  me t hod provi des al l  t he coi nt egrati on
vectors.  I n addi t i on t o t hi s,  we   check t he r obust ness of  t he coint egrati ng esti ma t es by
em ployi ng Sai kkonen’s me t hod wh i ch provi des asym pt ot i call y eff i cient  esti ma t es ( See
Sai kkonen,   1991).
Fur t hermo r e, for the short  run relati onshi p bet w een governm ent  expendi t ure
and gross dom est i c product ,  we  u t i l i se an E rr or Cor r ecti on M echanism  (ECM )  by
Or di nary Least Squares (OLS) ,  and deri ve t hi s E C M  using t he residual s fr om  t he
esti ma t ed coint egrati ng  r egression  f or  bot h  equat i ons  ( 1a)  and  ( 1b)  r especti vel y.
3
Thus,















∆LDUt - j  +  e t ( 2a)
wh e r e
ut - 1  i s t he  l agged  esti ma t ed r esidual   f r om   equat i on  ( 1a);
LGE,   LGDP,   and D U are as defi ned  i n  equat i on  ( 1a);
and















∆DUt - j  +  e t ( 2b)
wh e r e all  vari ables are as defi ned i n equat i on (1a) and (1b) and ∆ denot es the fi r st
di f f erences. The esti ma t ed err or corr ecti on t erm  shoul d be negat i ve and st ati sti call y
signi f i cant i n t he short - r un equat i ons (2a) and (2b).  Wi t h respect t o t he G ranger
Re pr esentati on Theorem  (GRT) ,  negat i ve and st ati sti cal signi f i cant err or corr ecti on
coeff i cients are necessary condi t i ons for t he relevant vari ables in quest i on t o be
coint egrated. Thi s provi des furt her evidence and confi r ma t i on for the st ati c long-r un
and  t he  dynam i c short - r un  com ponent s.
Mo r eover,  we  u s e  Ak a i ke’s M ini mu m F i nal  Pr edicti on Err or (FPE)  Cr i t eri on
wi t h H si ao’s synthesi s to choose t he opt i ma l  lag lengt hs bot h i n l og-l evels and l og-
di f f erences ( See Gi l es et  al,   1993)
4.   Ak a i ke’s Mi ni mu m  FPE  i s f ormu l ated as f ol l ow s:






wh e r e T is the sam pl e size, and k=m +1 i f  Lx and Ly are not  coint egrated; k=m +2 i f
t hey are coint egrated [Er r or corr ecti on t erm  shoul d t hen be added t o t he equat i on];
SSR( m)   i s t he  sum  of  t he  squared r esidual s.  Wh e n   m= m
*  i n  equat i on  ( 4a),   we   change n
t o fi nd out  the val ue n=n
* as to m i ni mi se FPE( m
*,  n) in w hi ch k= m
* + n+2 (i n t he
coint egrated case).   I f   FPE( m
*, n
*)   <  FPE( m
*)→  Y  Gr anger- Ca us e s   X.   The  val ues  of  m
and n are related w it h equat i on (4a).  We  t hen adopt  Gr anger- Ca us a l i t y t est t o
det ermi ne  t he  di r ecti on  of  t he  causali t y  bet w een t he  r elevant  vari ables.  Fr om   t he  GRT,
we   know   t hat   causali t y  shoul d  exist  i n  at  l east  one  di r ecti on  i n  t he  I ( 1)  vari ables.  I n  t he
l i ght  of GRT,  w e const r uct  the vect or autoregressive (VAR)  m odel  in t erms  o f  the
l evels and t he fi r st di f f erences of the vari ables under consi derati on.  We  u t i l i se err or
corr ecti on  t erm  f or  bot h  equat i ons  t o  capture short - r un  dynam i cs.
We   t est  Gr anger- Ca us a l i t y bet w een t he r elevant  vari ables such as X  and Y  t o
esti ma t e t he  f ol l ow i ng  VAR  m odel :










DLYt - j  +  ut ( 4a)










DLXt - j  +  vt ( 4b)
wh e r e D LX t = Ln ( Xt)  - Ln ( Xt - 1)  and ut and vtare seri all y uncorr elated random
di sturbances wi t h zero m ean.  I n all   cases,  Gr anger- Ca us a l i t y t ests are associated wi t h
t ests on t he signi f i cance of  t he g‘ s and t he e’s condi t i onal   on t he opt i ma l   l ag l engt hs,
m,  n,  q,  and r.  We  t est to see if  Y Gr anger- causes X  by usi ng t he hypot hesi s as
f ol l ow s:
Ho:g 1=g 2  =g3=. . .g   n  =  0  i s r ejected against   t he  alt ernat i ve,
H1:   not   H o.
Si mi l arl y,   we   t est  i f   X  Gr anger- causes Y  by  t esti ng  t he  hypot hesi s as bel ow :
H 0




Fi nal l y,  havi ng appl i ed Final  Pr edicti on Err or (FPE) ,  we  e mp l oy W al d and
Si m’ s L R  tests to det ermi ne t he di r ecti on of causali t y under OLS e s t i ma t i on.9
5.   Empi rical  Re s ul t s
Al l  our em pir i cal tests have been carr i ed out  by M i crofi t  4. 0 (Pesar an and Pesaran,
1997).  I ni t i all y w e i nvest i gat e the st ati onary propert i es of t he dat a using t he
A ugm ent ed Di ckey-Ful l er  ( ADF)   t est.   The  purpose of  ‘ augm ent i ng’  t he Di ckey-Ful l er
( DF)  regression i s to achieve w hit e noi se err ors. Wh e n  t he order of augm ent ati on i s
zero,   t he ADF  t est  wo r ks i n t he f orm  of  DF  t est.   The  ADF  t est  i s wi del y r egarded as
one  of  t he  mo s t   eff i cient  t est  f or  i nt egrati on  l evel.   I n  practi se,  i t   i s r egarded  as t he  mo s t
f avouri t e t est  am ong  t he  practi t i oners.  Ther efore,  we   f ormu l ate t he  ADF  r egression  f or
t he  t i me   seri es Xt  as f ol l ow s;





∆Xt - j  +  εt ( 5)
wh e r eεtr epresents a sequence of  uncorr elated stati onary err or  t erms   wi t h zero m ean
and  const ant  vari ance
5.   Ha v i ng  det ermi ned  t he  appropri ate val ue  of  p,   we   t est  H0:g   =
0 versus H1  :  g   <  0.   Re j ecti on of  H0i mp l i es t hat   Xt  i s I ( 0)  wh i l e acceptance i mp l i es
t hat   i t   i s i nt egrated of  order  ( 1).   I n ot her  wo r ds,   t he seri es Xt  i s stati onary i f  g <  1
( See C harem za and D eadm an, 1992;  124-131) and not  stati onary i f  g  = 1 ( See
Per ma n ,   1991).
Thi s sequent i al testi ng result s are show n i n Tabl e 1. The vi sual inspect i on of
t he vari ables in hand confi r ms  t he vi ew  that  the vari ables in quest i on-LGE,  LGENT,
and LG D P-are all  non-stati onary i n l evels but  stati onary i n fi r st di f f erences. In ot her
wo r ds,   t he ADF  t est  r esult s f or  uni t   r oot s confi r m  t hat   all   vari ables are i nt egrated of
order  one,   I ( 1)  i n l evels but   i nt egrated of  order  zero i n f i r st  di f f erences ( i . e.  stati onary
i n fi r st di f f erences).  Thi s sit uat i on i s denot ed as LG E~I( 1),  LGENT~I ( 1),  and
LGDP~I ( 1).
The  next   step i s t o  exam ine  t he  t ype  of  t r end  ( i . e.  stochast i c or  det ermi ni sti c)  i n
t i me   seri es dat a.  We   t hen em ploy Di ckey-Ful l er  LR  j oi nt   t est  ( or  F- t est)   t o check t he
r elevant  seri es i f   t hey  are DSP  or  TSP  ( See Di ckey and  Ful l er,   1981).   We   t est  t he  nul l
hypot hesi s of  DSP,   i . e. bi=  0 and a i=  1,   against   t he alt ernat i ve of  TSP  by usi ng t he
f ol l ow i ng  equat i on:10
∆Xt  = bo+ b1t + a 1Xt - 1  +  a 2
1 i
n
= ∑ ∆Xt - i  +  e t ( 6)
wh e r e et is a zero m ean, seri all y uncorr elated and m utual l y i ndependent  di sturbance
t erm.bo,b1, a 1,  and a 2 are all  param eters esti ma t ed by O LS regression and t  is a
t i me   t r end.
As  a  r esult ,  the nul l  hypot hesi s of D SP cannot  be rejected for all  vari ables in
consi derati on.  Thus t he vari ables in quest i on are said t o DSP.  Tabl e 2 indi cates that
t he  t est  stati sti cs,  i . e.  1. 85,   3. 22,   and  3. 50  seem  t o  be  appropri ate t o  all ow   us  t o  claim
t hat  w e have a D SP process. In ot her wo r ds,  stati onari t y i s achieved by successive
di f f erencing  ( See Ne l son  and  Pl osser,   1982).
As  r egards t o real governm ent  expendi t ure (LGE)  and non-t r ansfer r eal
governm ent  expendi t ure (LGENT)  for the peri od 1977-1996,  w e observe a decli ne
aft er  1987.   Thi s ma y   be  capturi ng  a str uct ural  break on  bot h  LGE  and  LGENT  f or  t he
TRNC.   We   t hen  em ploy  t he  A ddi t i ve  Ou t l i er  Per r on  Tes t   f or  uni t   r oot s wi t h  str uct ural
break (See Perr on,  1990,  Per r on and V ogel sang,  1992)
6.  The r esult s presented in
Tabl e 3 suggest  that  there seem s to be no ‘spuri ous root ’  result i ng fr om  st r uct ural
breaks w hich occurr ed in 1988.  We  e mp l oy t he fol l ow i ng equat i ons for str uct ural
break.  Thi s i s t he  AOM  version  of  t he  Per r on  i nt egrati on  l evel  t est  and  i t   i s carr i ed out
i n  t wo - steps ( See Per r on,   1990).










∆Xt - i  +  e t ( 7)
wh e r e
( DUTB)   t=1  i f   t =Tb+1  and  0  ot herwi se
Tb  i s t he  break year,
DUTB  i s d u mmy   vari able f or  t he  break year,   and  e t  i s an err or  t erm.
We   can concl ude  t hat   t he  eff ects of  exogenous  break are i nsi gni f i cant  and  t here
i s no spuri ous uni t   r oot   created by exogenous breaks i n t he exam ined seri es.  The  next
step i s t o  t est  f or  coint egrati on bet w een LGE,   LGENT  and LGDP,   wh i ch are all   I ( 1).
We  e s t i ma t e the EG  st ati c long-r un regression by O LS t o i nvest i gat e w hether the
r esidual s are stati onary or not .  A s u f f i cient condi t i on for a joi nt  coint egrati on am ong11
t he vari ables in a l ong-r un regression i s that  the err or u t and vt shoul d be st ati onary.
The  r esidual   based ADF  t est  stati sti cs f or  ut  and vtensure t hat   we   r eject  t he nul l   of  no
coint egrati on at  5%  si gni f i cance level.  I ndeed, i f  LGE~I ( 1),  LGENT~I ( 1) and
LGDP~I ( 1)  are coint egrated,ut  and vtshoul d be I ( 0)  [ See equat i ons ( 8a)  and 8b and
Tabl e 5].  The f ol l ow i ng i s the est i ma t i on result s of the coi nt egrati on regression for
equat i ons  ( 1a)  and  equat i ons  ( 1b)  by  OLS:
LGEt  =  - 8. 41  +  1. 86  LGDP t  -   0. 27  DU8 8 ( 8a)
  ( - 4. 55)        ( 8. 48)                                ( - 2. 57)
R
2 093 = . R
2
092 = . CRDW   =1. 94 A D F
*  =  - 4. 55 CV   =  - 4. 19                SER  =  0. 095
Di agnost i c Tes t s
χ
2
SERCOR=0. 082  ( Pr ob=0. 92) χ
2
NORM=0. 50(Pr ob=0. 76)  FHET( 1, 16)=0. 068(Pr ob=0. 79)
* N o augm ent ati on i s necessary t o be suff i cient to secure lack of autocorr elati on of
err or  t erms .
LGENTt  =  - 5. 26  +  1. 44  LGDP t  -   0. 20  DU8 8 ( 8b)
              ( - 2. 93)        ( 6. 78)         ( - 1. 97)
R
2 089 = . R
2
088 = . CRDW   =  1. 79 A D F
*=  - 4. 35 CV   =- 4. 19                SER  =  0. 096
Di agnost i c Tes t s
χ
2
SERCOR=  0. 035  ( Pr ob=0. 85)χ
2
NORM =  0. 49  ( Pr ob=0. 78)  FHET( 4, 91)=0. 513
* N o augm ent ati on i s necessary t o be suff i cient to secure lack of autocorr elati on of
err or  t erms .
No t es:  t - stati sti cs are i n  parentheses and  all   di agnost i cs pass at  5%   l evel  of  signi f i cance
f or  bot h  equat i ons  above.
Tabl e 5 i ndi cates t hat   t here i s evidence of  a l ong-r un r elati onshi p bet w een r eal
GDP  and r eal  governm ent   expendi t ure and non-t r ansfer  r eal  governm ent   expendi t ure.
For   t he l ong-r un i m pact,   t he coeff i cients of  t he i ncom e vari able i n bot h equat i ons are
f ound t o be posi t i ve and signi f i cantl y di f f erent  f r om  one ( i . e.  t he coeff i cient  of  LGDP
exceed unit y such as 1.86 and 1. 44 respecti vel y).  At  thi s stage, w e cannot  concl ude
t hat   our  f i ndi ngs are l i kel y t o support   W agner’ s l aw  f or  TRNC  case before em ployi ng
t he Gr anger- Ca us a l i t y t esti ng procedure.  Ho we v e r ,   W agner’ s hypot hesi s suggest s t hat12
t he causal  f l ow  r uns f r om  i ncom e ( GDP)   t o governm ent   expendi t ure wh i l st  K eynesi an
proposi t i on  i ndi cates an opposi t e causal  f l ow .
I t   i s i m port ant  t o not e t hat   t he esti ma t ed t - val ues i n parentheses i n equat i ons ( 8a)  and
( 8b)  have  onl y  a descri pt i ve  r ol e t o  pl ay since t he  vari ables are non-stati onary.   Hi gh  R
2
suggest s that  (f or bot h equat i ons 8a and 8b) our long-r un O LS est i ma t ors are not
subst anti all y bi ased.  Si nce CRDW >  R
2,   t he j oi nt   coint egrati on i s ensured ( Ba na r j ee et
al,   1993).
I nt he  r elevant  equat i ons,   we   use  d u mmy   vari able f or  1988  i n  order  t o  t ake i nt o
account  t he st r uct ural break in t he relevant year.  The dum m y used for 1988 m ay
capture the eff ects of the subsequent  Econom i c Prot ocol s signed i n t he l ate 1980s
bet w een t he  TRNC  and  Tur key.   Ho we v e r   t he  sign  of  t he  d u mmy   ma y   be  capturi ng  t he
adverse eff ects of  t he  cir cum stances on  governm ent   expendi t ure.
To  t est  i f   t here i s a singl e coint egrati on vector  or  not ,   we   em ploy a ma x i mu m
l i kel i hood (ML )  t est (Johansen and Jusel i us,  1990).  Tabl e 4 confi r ms  t he uni que
coint egrati ng vect or am ong t he relevant vari ables. The t w o equat i ons are esti ma t ed
wi t hout  a constant term,  wi t h restr i cted int ercepts and no t r ends.  Bot h provi de i n
f avour of coint egrati on.  I n t hi s table, t r ace and m aximu m e i gen val ue st ati sti cs
7
support   t he  nul l   hypot hesi s of  a ‘ uni que  coint egrati on  vector’ .
On  t he basi s of t he result s, t he l ong-r un relati onshi p bet w een governm ent
expendi t ure and G D P is found by usi ng t he M L approach. Thi s confi r m s earl i er
f i ndi ngs but  wi t hout  evidence of causali t y,  not hi ng can be sai d w het her W agner’ s or
K eynes’ hypot heses are vali d.  Ne v e r t hel ess, the l ong-r un O LS i s sti l l  bi ased if  the
expl anatory vari ables are assum ed not   t o be w eakly exogenous.   To  r em edy t hi s,  Engl e
and G ranger ( 1987) argue t hat  a simp l e w ay to check ‘w eak exogenei t y’ of
expl anatory vari ables i s t o esti ma t e an Er r or  Cor r ecti on M odel   ( ECM ) .   Thus we   t est
t he  stati sti cal  signi f i cance of  t he  EC  t erms   usi ng  a t r adit i onal   t - t est.   I f   t he  r esult   of  such
a t - t est  i s signi f i cant  t hen t he expl anatory vari able can no l onger  be t r eated as ‘ w eakly
exogenous’.  Ou r  calculati on show s t hat  LGDP i n equat i ons (1a) and (1b) is w eakly
exogenous.   These r esult s are not   r eport ed,  but   avail able on  r equest .
To  t est  wh e t her  our  OLS  r esult s are r obust   or  not ,   we   ut i l i se t he  asym pt ot i call y
eff i cient OLS e s t i ma t or of Sai kkonen.  Thi s esti ma t or i s obt ained fr om  t he O LS13
esti ma t or  by a t i me   dom ai n corr ecti on ( Sai kkonen,   1991).   We   also em ploy Engl e and
Y oo ( 1991)  t hree-step corr ecti on me t hod t o obt ain unbi ased l ong-r un and stati sti call y
val i d standard err ors f or  our  param eters.  Du e   t o non-norma l i t y of  t he di str i but i on,   EG
esti ma t es t he stati c coint egrati ng r egression wh i ch ma y   be subst anti all y bi ased.  Al l   t he
l ong-r un mu l t i vari ate esti ma t es are r eport ed i n Tabl es 6 and 7 f or  bot h equat i ons ( 1a)
and (1b).  These result s reveal our ori gi nal  stati c O LS esti ma t es for t he relevant
vari ables,  t hat   i s m easures based  on  t he  EG  me t hod,   are r obust .
Du e   t o  t he  stati c str uct ure of  t he  coint egrati ng  r egression  and  t he  sm all   sam ple
size, the est i ma t es of the st ati c coint egrati ng regression param eters are said t o be
‘ super  consi stent’   ( See St ock,   1987).   To  r em edy t hi s probl em ,  som e econom et r i cians
consi der  t he l agged and di f f erence t erms .   Thus,   we   em ploy ECM   t o t est  f or  short   r un
adjust me n t  t ow ards l ong-r un equi l i bri um ,  and t o expl ore the relati onshi p bet w een
governm ent  expendi t ure and G D P (i f  any) i n t he short - r un.  The r esult s of t he
parsim oni ous dynam i c m odel ,  usi ng t he err or terms  f r om  t he O LS regression are, as
f ol l ow s:
∆LGEt=  0. 036  -   0. 78ut - 1+  1. 06∆LGDP t  -   0. 21∆  DU8 8 ( 9a)
( 1. 35)            ( - 3. 26)                  ( 2. 69)                                  ( - 2. 20)
R
2 053 = . R
2
044 = . SER  =  0. 032
Di agnost i c Tes t s
χ
2
SERCOR=3. 84  ( Pr ob=0. 05) χ
2
NORM=2. 40(Pr ob=0. 3)  FHET( 1, 17)=0. 46(Pr ob=0. 50)
∆LGENTt  =  0. 035  -   0. 87ut - 1+  0. 88  ∆LGDP t  -   0. 20∆DU8 8 ( 9b)
                  ( 1. 45)          ( - 4. 26)                ( 2. 61)                                        ( - 2. 62)
R
2 051 = . R
2
046 = . SER=  0. 031
Di agnost i c Tes t s
χ
2
SERCOR=3. 74  ( Pr ob=0. 05) χ
2
NORM=0. 86  ( Pr ob=0. 35)  FHET( 1, 17)=0. 057  ( 0. 45)
No t es: t - stati sti cs are in parentheses and al l  di agnost i cs pass at 5%  l evel of
signi f i cance.14
For  bot h equat i ons,  the Err or Cor r ecti on t erm i s negat i ve and si gni f i cant at the one
percent level and t he m agni t udes of the corr espondi ng coeff i cients show  that  almo s t
90%  and 80%  of  any di sequi l i bri um  i n t he l ong-r un r elati onshi p bet w een vari ables are
corr ected aft er  one  year.   I n  ot her  wo r ds,   out put   adjust   i t s equil i bri um   l evel  qui ckly  and
t he  err or  corr ecti on  t erms   provi de  f urt her  evidence  t hat   t he  vari ables i n  t he  equi l i bri um
r egression are coint egrated. Al l  cont em poraneous val ues are also signi f i cant,  wh i ch
support s t he  previous  f i ndi ngs
8.
Ha v i ng est abli shed that  r eal governm ent  expendi t ure and real GDP a r e
coint egrated wi t h  t he  i ncl usi on  of  t he  r elevant  d u mmy ,   we   use  t he  concept  of  t he  GRT.
Thi s theorem  tell s us that  causali t y m ust  exist at least in one di r ecti on,  in t he I( 1)
vari ables.  The  causali t y  i ssue i s a very  cruci al  poi nt   i n  t he  cont ext  of  bi vari ate analysi s,
i . e. W agner’ s L aw . It  is im port ant to m ent i on t hat  if  there is evidence of Gr anger
causali t y f r om  governm ent   expendi t ure t o GDP  and not   vi ce versa,  t he Law  w oul d be
under  suspicion.   To  i nvest i gat e t hi s,  we   f i r st  use t he Fi nal   Pr edicti on Er r or  Cr i t eri a t o
det ermi ne  t he  opt i ma l   l ag-l engt h  f or  t he  r elevant  vari ables i n  t he  VAR  m odel s.
Tabl e 8 show s t he opt i ma l  l ag lengt hs for t he relevant vari ables and also
FPE( m
*)   and  FPE  ( m
*,   n
*)   val ues are r eport ed wh e r e t hese val ues suggest   t hat   t here i s
uni di r ecti onal  causali t y fr om  real governm ent  expendi t ure and nont r ansfer r eal
governm ent  expendi t ure to t he real GDP.  It  is w ort h not i ng t hat  there is a reverse
causali t y accordi ng t o W agner’ s L aw  at l og-di f f erences. Thi s fi ndi ng support s the
K eynesi an proposi t i on  r ather  t han  W agner’ s proposi t i on.
To obt ain t he result s w hich are report ed in Tabl e 9, we  f ol l ow  t he forma l
Gr anger- Ca us a l i t y  t esti ng  procedure.  We   t hen  em ploy  Wa l d  and  Si ms ’   t est  stati sti cs t o
obt ain t he usual  asym pt ot i c χ
2 di str i but i on.  The W al d t est refers to a t est of zero
r estr i cti on on t he i ndependent  vari ables in equat i ons of 4a and 4b.  We  t hen use a
simp l e l ogari t hm i c t r ansforma t i on  wh i ch convert s Wa l d stati sti cs i nt o LR  t est  stati sti cs
i n order  t o obt ain r esult s f or  Si ms ’   LR  t est.   Thi s t r ansforma t i on i s also asym pt ot i call y
χ
2  ( See Gi l es et  al  1993:   202,   Si ms ,   1980: 17).
As   can be seen,  t he evidence of  causali t y i s f r om  r eal  governm ent   expendi t ure
( LGE)   and nont r ansfer  r eal  governm ent   expendi t ure ( LGENT)   t o r eal  GDP.   Thi s also
show s  t hat   K eynesi an proposi t i on  pl ays a cruci al  r ol e f or  t he  TRNC  econom y.   We   also15
t ake the earl i er evidence of coint egrati on bet ween LGE,  LGENT and LGDP i nt o
account  at log-l evels data. Tabl e 10 show s t he result s that  if  a pair  of vari ables are
coint egrated,  causali t y shoul d exist  at  l east  i n one di r ecti on.   Ho we v e r ,   t he evidence i n
Tabl e 11 i s mi xed.   The  FPE  r esult s show  t hat   t here i s bi - di r ecti onal   causali t y bet w een
LGE  and LGDP  at  l og-l evel  and t here i s no support   f or  t hi s on t he basi s of  t he Wa l d
t est  and  LR  t ests.  Ho we v e r ,   t here i s uni di r ecti onal   causali t y  f r om   LGDP  t o  LGENT  at
l og-di f f erence on the basi s of the FPE and t hi s sit uat i on i s support ed by W al d and
Si ms ’  LR t ests. Tabl e 11 provi des a sum m ary for thi s study w here the not ati on →
denot es uni di r ecti onal   causali t y;   and  ↔  i ndi cates bi - di r ecti onal   causali t y.16
6.C oncl usi on
The l ong-r un relati onshi p bet w een real governm ent  expendi t ure and real gross
dom est i c product  wa s  t ested using aggregate ti me  s e r i es TR N C  data for the peri od
1977-1996.  Gi ven t he sm al l  sam ple size, our r esult s are indi cati ve rather t han
defi ni t i ve.  Ini t i all y,  t he dat a seri es w ere found t o be non-stati onary i n l evels, but
stati onary i n di f f erences. Secondl y,  t he m odel s w ere found t o be coi nt egrated.
Coi nt egrati on i s essenti al f or t he val i d t est of Wa g n e r ’ s L aw . At  t hi s point ,  we
i ncl uded a d u mmy   vari able t o capture t he eff ects of  t he Econom i c Pr ot ocol   wh i ch had
occurr ed i n  1988.   Thi r dl y,   we   em ployed  t he  Johansen  Ma x i mu m  Li kel i hood  esti ma t i on
t o  confi r m  t he  uni queness  of  t he  coint egrati on  vector  am ong  t he  vari ables under  study.
Fi nal l y,  w e used the FPE Cr i t eri a and forma l  Gr anger Ca us a l i t y t esti ng procedure to
det ermi ne t he di r ecti on of  causali t y.   We   ma y   draw  som e concl usi ons f r om  t hese t ests
t hat   t here i s uni - di r ecti onal   causali t y  ( or  r everse causali t y  accordi ng  t o  W agner’ s Law)
f r om LGE and LGENT t o  LGDP a t  log di f f erence w hich support s the K eynesi an
proposi t i on.   On   t he  ot her  hand,   at  t he  l og  l evels,  t here i s a uni di r ecti onal   causali t y  f r om
LGDP t o LGENT whi ch support s the proposi t i on of W agner’ s L aw  for TRN C over
t he  peri od  1977-1996.17
End  No t es
1.The  dat a are provi ded  by  t he  St ate Panni ng  Or gani sati on,   Ni cosia,  TRNC,   1996.
2 .GENT i s com put ed by deduct i ng t ot al t r ansfer expendi t ures fr om  t he t ot al
governm ent  expendi t ure. Bi r d (1971),  Mu s g r ave &  M usgrave (1988) favour the
i ncl usi on of tr ansfers int o governm ent  expendi t ure. Ho we v e r ,  Br ow n &  Jackson
( 1990)  argue  t hat   excludi ng  t r ansfer  paym ent s i s useful   wh e n   exam ini ng  t he  grow t h
of  publ i c expendi t ure.
3.N ot e that  w e use H endry’s general- t o-specif i c m odel l i ng st r ategy (See M il l er,
1991).
4.W e f ol l ow  Gi l es et  al  ( 1993)  f ait hful l y t o det ermi ne t he l ag l engt hs on t he basi s of
Ak a i ke’s Mi ni mu m  Fi nal   Pr edicti on  Er r or.
5.The ‘ ADF’   c o mma n d   i n Mi crofi t   i ncl udes t he i nt ercept  t erm  i n t he ADF  equat i on.
Ther efore the corr espondi ng cri t i cal val ues shoul d t ake the i nt ercept t erm i nt o
account .   ( Pesar an and  Pesar an,  1997)
6.Perr on (1990) suggest s two  t ypes of m odel s for testi ng uni t  root s w it h st r uct ural
break, t he A ddi t i ve O ut l i er M odel  (AOM)  and t he Innovat i onal  Ou t l i er M odel
( I OM)  respecti vel y.  Th e  AOM i s recom m ended for ‘sudden’ str uct ural changes
wh i l st the IOM i s appl i ed for ‘gradual ’  str uct ural changes. In an econom y,  it  is
bel i eved that  ‘sudden’ is m ore appropri ate than ‘gradual ’ .  Ther efore w e prefer to
use  t he  AOM  i n  t he  case of  TRNC.
7.Rei me r s (1992) f i nds t hat  t he Johansen procedure over- r ejects w hen the nul l -
hypot hesi s i s t r ue i n t he case of  sm all   sam ples.  Thus he suggest s t hat   ( T- P)   version
i s the corr ected stati sti cs for the sm al l  sam ples and thi s can be corr ected by usi ng
( T- P)  log (1-λi)  rather than T l og (1-λi) .  In t hi s test,  p=nk t akes account  of the
num ber  of  esti ma t ed param eters and  T  i s t he  num ber  of  usabl e observat i ons.
8.In t hi s study,  we  f i r st esti ma t e short - r un ECM  w i t h one l ags of each vari able and
eli mi nat e those l ags w it h i nsi gni f i cant param eter esti ma t es. Secondl y,  we  r e-
esti ma t e simp l er  m odel s t o f i nd out   t he mo s t   suit able m odel .   I n addi t i on t o t hi s,  we
appl y t he i nst r um ent al  vari able ( I V)   me t hod t o ensure our  OLS  short - r un esti ma t es
are not   j eopardi sed by  t he  presence of  som e cont em poraneous eff ects.18
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Appendi x
Tabl e  1. ADF  ( Augm ent ed  Di ckey- Ful l er)   Test   f or   Uni t   Root s
          Test   st at i st i cs C ri t i cal   Val ues
Var i abl e
Level 1st
Char em za  and
Deadm an
M acki nnon
di f f er ence 5% 10% 5% 10%
LG DPt - 1. 89 - 4. 75 - 2. 18 - 1. 76 - 3. 03 - 2. 66
LG Et - 2. 84 - 4. 81 “ “ “ “
LG ENTt - 3. 34 - 5. 34 “ “ “ “
The  corr espondi ng  cri t i cal   val ues  f or   20  num ber   of   obser vat i ons  at   5%   and  10%   si gni f i cance
l evel s  ar e  obt ai ned  f r om   Char em za  and  Deadm an  ( 1997)   and  M acki nnon  ( 1991) .   The  l ower   val ues
ar e  r epor t ed  onl y  i n  Char em za  and  Deadm an  ( 1997) .   I t   i s  wor t h  not i ng  t hat   t he  i nt er cept   t er ms   ar e
i n  t he  ADF  equat i ons.   I n  al l   cases,   no  augm ent at i on  i s  necessar y  t o  be  suf f i ci ent   t o  secure  l ack  of
aut o- corr el at i on  of   er r or - t er ms .
Tabl e  2. DF  Li kel i hood  Rat i o  ( LR)   Joi nt   Test   For   DSP  vs  TSP
Var i abl eT e s t   St at i st i cs C ri t i cal   Val ues  ( n=20)
5% 10% 1%
LG DPt 1. 85 6. 99 5. 76 9. 96
LG Et 3. 22 “ “ “
LG ENTt 3. 50 “ “ “
The  corr espondi ng  cri t i cal   val ues  obt ai ned  f r om   Di ckey  and  Ful l er   ( 1981,   p. 1063,   Tabl e  VI )
l evel   f or   20  num ber   of   obser vat i ons.   I n  al l   cases,   an  augm ent at i on  of   one  appear ed  t o  be
suf f i ci ent   t o  secure  l ack  of aut ocor r el at i on  of   t he  er r or   t er ms .   I t   i s  wor t h  not i ng  t hat   t he
cri t i cal   val ues  f or   20  num ber   of   obser vat i ons  do  not   exi st   i n  t he  r el evant   t abl e  whi ch  i s
t abul at ed  by  Di ckey  and  Ful l er   ( 1981) .   Thi s  t abl e  i ndi cat es  t hat   cri t i cal   val ues  t end  t o
i ncr ease  as  sam pl e  si ze  ( n)   decr eases.   Hence  t he  r epor t ed  val ues  can  be  accept ed  f or
20  num ber   of   obser vat i ons
Tabl e  3. Per r on  Uni t   Root   Test   f or   St ru ctur al   Break
Var i abl eB r eak
Test   St at i st i cs C ri t i cal   val ue
Year Level 1st   di f f er ence ( 5% ) , λ λ=0. 6( 5% ) , λ λ=0. 7
LG DPt 1991 - 1. 91 - 4. 57 - 3. 78 - 3. 67
LG Et 1988 - 1. 17 - 4. 19 “ “
LG ENTt 1988 - 1. 17 - 4. 70 “ “
We   use  t he  cri t i cal   val ues  r epor t ed  by  Ry bi nski   i nst ead  of   t he  or i gi nal   cri t i cal   val ues  r epor t ed
by Per r on.   The  corr espondi ng  br eak  f r act i on  f or   20  num ber   of   obser vat i on  ar e  cal cul at ed
easi l y  wi t h  λ λ=( Tb/   T)   [ See  Per r on  and  Vogel sang,   1992] .   For   1988  and  1991,   t he  r el evant   br eak
f r act i ons  ar e  λ λ=12/ 20=0. 6  and  λ λ=15/ 20=0. 7.   I n  mo s t   cases,   an  augm ent at i on  of   one  or   t wo  appear   t o  be
suf f i ci ent   t o  secure  l ack  of   aut ocor r el at i on  of   t he  er r or   t er ms .21
Tabl e  4. Johansen  M axi mu m  Li kel i hood  ( ML )   Pr ocedur e
Coi nt egr at i on  Li kel i hood  Rat i o  ( LR)   Test   t o  det er mi ne  t he  num ber   of
coi nt egr at i on  vect or s  ( r )   based  on  Ma x i ma l   Ei gen  val ue  of   t he  st ochast i c
ma t r i x,   Tr ace  of   t he  st ochast i c  ma t r i x  and  t he  ( T- P)   versi on  i s  f or   t he  sm al l
sam pl e  suggest ed  by  Rei me r s  ( 1992) .




Al t er nat i ve
Hypot hesi s
λma x λma x
( T- P)
Cr i t i cal   val ue
at   5%
λt r ace λt r ace
( T- P)
Cr i t i cal   val ue
at   5%
LG Et=
f ( LG DPt,   DU88)
r =0 r =1 20. 07 17. 06 15. 67 29. 19 24. 81 19. 96
r <=1 r =2 9. 11 7. 74 9. 24 9. 12 7. 75 9. 24
LG ENTt=
f ( LG DPt,   DU88)
r =0 r =1 20. 38 17. 32 15. 67 26. 06 22. 15 19. 96
r <=1 r =2 5. 67 4. 82 9. 24 5. 68 4. 83 9. 24
r   i ndi cat es  t he  num ber   of   coi nt egr at i ng  r el at i onshi ps.
λma x  i s  t he  ma x i mu m  ei gen  val ue  st at i st i c,   λt r ace  i s  t he  t r ace  st at i st i c.   The  ( T- P)   versi on  i s
t he  corr ect ed  st at i st i c  f or   sm al l   sam pl es  suggest ed  by  Rei me r s  ( 1992) .   VAR1  based  on
AI C  i s  used  i n  t he  Johansen  pr ocedur e  and  t he  r est r i ct ed  const ant   and  no  t r end  ar e  not
r ej ect ed  i n  al l   cases.   DU88  i s  consi der ed  as  exogenous  I ( 1)   vari abl e.   The  cri t i cal   val ues
ar e  obt ai ned  f r om   Os t er wal d- Lenum   ( 1992) .
Tabl e  5.       The  Resi dual - based  ADF  t est   f or   coi nt egrat i on
Coi nt egr at i on Cal cul at ed
Cr i t i cal   val ue





Res i dual s
Char em za  and
Deadm an
M acki nnon
5% 10% 5% 10%
LG Et  =
f ( LG DPt ,   DU88) 0. 93 0. 92 1. 94 - 4. 55 - 4. 34 - 3. 91 - 4. 19 - 3. 77
LG ENTt   =
f ( LG DPt ,   DU88) 0. 89 0. 88 1. 79 - 4. 35 - 4. 34 - 3. 91 - 4. 19 - 3. 77
The  r epor t ed  cri t i cal   val ues  ar e  obt ai ned  f r om   Char em za  and  Deadm an  ( 1997)   and
M acki nnon  ( 1991) .   The  l ower   val ues  ar e  r epor t ed  onl y  i n  Char em za  and  Deadm an  ( 1997) .
They  corr espond  t o  20  num ber   of   obser vat i ons.   I t   i s  wor t h  not i ng  t hat   t he  i nt er cept
t er ms   ar e  i ncl uded  i n  t he  r esi dual   based  ADF  equat i ons.   No  augm ent at i on  i s
necessar y  t o  be  suf f i ci ent   t o  secure  l ack  of   aut ocor r el at i on  of   t he  er r or   t er ms .22
Tabl e  6. El ast i ci t y  est i ma t es  of   mu l t i vari at e  l ong- r un  relat i onshi p
A  com par i son  of   di f f er ent   appr oaches
El ast i ci t y  Est i ma t es
St at i c( Engl e- Yoo) O LS  wi t h  t i me
Var i abl eO L S T h r ee- St ep dom ai n  corr ect i on
( Engl e- Gr anger )C o r r ect ed  Val ues ( Sai kkonen)
C- 8. 41 - 9. 79 - 10. 33
( - 4. 55)
++ ( - 2. 82)
* ( - 6. 54)
++
LG DPt 1. 86 1. 69 2. 08
( 8. 48)
++ ( 4. 04)
++ ( 11. 10)
++
DU88 - 0. 28 - 0. 22 - 0. 33
( - 2. 57)
** ( - 1. 82)
*** ( - 3. 77)
++
Di f f er ent   appr oaches  ( t echni ques)   have  been  r un  on  t he  equat i on  bel ow:
LG Et=  f ( LG DPt ,   DU88)
( t - val ues  ar e  shown  i n  par ent heses)
one  * i ndi cat es  si gni f i cance  at   t he  1%   l evel ,   t wo  **indi cat e  si gni f i cance  at   t he
5%   l evel ,   and  t hr ee  *** i ndi cat e  si gni f i cance  at   10%   l evel .
Tabl e  7. El ast i ci t y  est i ma t es  of   mu l t i vari at e  l ong- r un  relat i onshi p
A  com par i son  of   di f f er ent   appr oaches
El ast i ci t y  Est i ma t es
St at i c( Engl e- Yoo) O LS  wi t h  t i me
Var i abl eO L S T h r ee- St ep dom ai n  corr ect i on
( Engl e- Gr anger )C o r r ect ed  Val ues ( Sai kkonen)
C- 5. 26 - 6. 48 - 7. 12
( - 2. 93)
* ( - 2. 10) ** (- 3. 47)
++
LG DPt 1. 45 1. 59 1. 66
( 6. 78)
++ ( 4. 09)
++ ( 7. 08)
++
DU88 - 0. 20 - 0. 31 - 0. 25
( - 1. 93)
** ( - 1. 72)
*** ( - 2. 35)
**
Di f f er ent   appr oaches  ( t echni ques)   have  been  r un  on  t he  equat i on  bel ow:
LG ENTt=  f ( LG DPt ,   DU88)
( t - val ues  ar e  shown  i n  par ent heses)
O ne  * i ndi cat es  si gni f i cance  at   t he  1%   l evel ,   t wo  ** i ndi cat e  si gni f i cance  at   t he
5%   l evel ,   t hr ee  *** i ndi cat e  si gni f i cance  at   10%   l evel ;   and  ++i ndi cat e  very  si gni f i cance.23






* FPE  ( m
*) FPE  ( m
*,   n
*)
DLGE DLGDP 1 1 7. 34*10
- 3 7. 86*10
- 3
DLGDP DLGE 1 2 1. 78*10
- 3 1. 39*10
- 3
DLGENT DLGDP 3 2 2. 15*10
- 3 2. 31*10
- 3
DLGDP DLGENT 1 2 2. 09*10
- 3 1. 7*10
- 3
Not es:I f   FPE  ( m
*, n
*)   <  FPE  ( m
*) ,   Y  Gr anger - Causes  X
m
*  denot es  ma x i mu m  l ag  on  dependent   vari abl e
n
*  denot es  mi ni mu m  l ag  on  i ndependent   vari abl e
Tabl e  9. Gr anger - Causal i t y  bet w een  G overnm ent   expendi t ur e  ( GE)   and  G ross  dom est i c









Wa l d  t est Si ms ’   LR  t est
DLGE DLGDP 1 0. 46 0. 62
DLGDP DLGE 2 6. 06
** 7. 46
**
DLGENT DLGDP 2 1. 25 2. 33




**  i ndi cat es  si gni f i cance  at   t he  5%   l evel
a;   d u mmy   vari abl e  i s  i ncl uded  as  expl anat or y  vari abl e
b;χ
2 degr ees  of   f r eedom   f or   bot h  Wa l d  and  LR  t est s.24
Tabl e  10.       Resul t s  based  on  l og- l evel s  dat a
Dependent   vari abl e















- 3 1. 66*10
- 3 7. 53*10





- 3 1. 34*10
- 3 6. 10*10
- 3 2. 02*10
- 3
Wa l d  t est 2. 83 2. 73 5. 98 3. 44
Si ms ’   LR  t est 3. 50 3. 99 6. 88 4. 53
degr ees  of   f r eedom   ( d. f . ) 1322
Not es: I f   FPE  ( m
*, n
*)   <  FPE  ( m
*) ,   Y  Gr anger - Causes  X
m
*  denot es  ma x i mu m  l ag  on  dependent   vari abl e
n
*  denot es  mi ni mu m  l ag  on  i ndependent   vari abl e
d. f . ;χ
2 degr ees  of   f r eedom   f or   bot h  Wa l d  and  Si ms ’   LR  t est s.
**i ndi cat es  si gni f i cance  at   t he  5%   l evel .
Tabl e  11. Sum m ary  of   Causal i t y  Resul t s
l og- di f f erences l og- l evel s
FPE χ χ
2t est s FPE χ χ
2t est s
GE→GDP GE→GDP GE↔GDP GE  -   GDP
( No  Causal i t y)
GENT→  GDP GENT→  GDP GENT←GDP GENT←GDP
Not es:   GE,   r eal   gover nm ent   expendi t ur e;   GENT,   non- t r ansf er   r eal   gover nm ent   expendi t ur e;   GDP,   r eal
GDP